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How Roe v. Wade Was Written 
David J. Garrow* 
Let me begin with one sentence that Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun uttered in 1987: “Roe against Wade1 was not such a 
revolutionary opinion at the time” that it was handed down in 
January 1973,2 and in that statement Justice Blackmun was 
indisputably correct. 
In the beginning, of course, there was Griswold v. 
Connecticut3 in 1965, and it is always essential to remind people 
that Griswold was not a “test case,” as Judge Robert H. Bork 
labeled it during his 1987 testimony to the Judiciary Committee 
of the United States Senate following his nomination to the High 
Court,4 but that Griswold was in fact, as any competent student 
of constitutional law should know, an appeal of two trial court 
criminal convictions, of Estelle Griswold, the executive director of 
Connecticut Planned Parenthood, and Dr. C. Lee Buxton, 
chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Yale 
University’s Medical School and a volunteer physician for 
Planned Parenthood.5 
Griswold and Buxton had been convicted of aiding and 
abetting married female patients of Planned Parenthood’s New 
Haven clinic in their use of contraceptive devices for the purpose 
                                                                                                     
 * Research Professor of History & Law, University of Pittsburgh School 
of Law. I would like to thank my assistant Patty Blake for her help in preparing 
this manuscript, which builds off of remarks delivered at Stanford 
Constitutional Law Center’s Symposium on “Roe at 40” on March 7, 2013, as 
well as at Washington & Lee University School of Law’s similarly titled 
Symposium on November 7, 2013. 
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. Bill Moyers: In Search of the Constitution: Mr. Justice Blackmun (PBS 
television broadcast Apr. 26, 1987) (interviewing Justice Blackmun).  
 3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 4. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
100th Cong. 116 (1987).  
 5. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.  
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of preventing conception.6 Their bench trial convictions had been 
affirmed first by a unanimous intermediate state appellate court7 
and then by a unanimous Connecticut Supreme Court.8 Thus 
what confronted the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
December 1964 when they unanimously agreed to hear the 
Griswold appeal9 was a constitutional challenge to a long-
standing state statute criminalizing the use of contraceptive 
articles,10 a statute which twice before had been brought before 
the High Court without resulting in a decision on the merits.11 
Griswold was before the High Court in the October Term of 
1964 not just because Tileston v. Ullman12 had been ineptly 
litigated by “white shoe” counsel whose imprecise complaint 
doomed their case,13 or because the Warren Court itself, and 
especially Justice William J. Brennan Jr., just four years earlier 
had refused to find any true case and controversy in Poe v. 
Ullman,14 but far more fundamentally because for over forty 
years Roman Catholic political influence in Connecticut had 
blocked any legislative repeal of the law criminalizing any use of 
contraception, which part-time legislator and circus impresario 
                                                                                                     
 6. Id.; see also DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 203–13 (rev. ed. 
1998) (providing additional details on the factual lead-up to Griswold). 
 7. See State v. Griswold, 200 A.2d 479, 480 (Conn. 1964) (detailing the 
procedural history of the case). 
 8. Id. at 479. 
 9. Supreme Court Docket Sheet, Justice Tom C. Clark Papers, Box C81 
(1964) (on file with University of Texas Law Library); Supreme Court Docket 
Sheet (1964) (on file with Library of Congress, Warren Box 379); see also 
GARROW, supra note 6, at 229 (citing to the docket sheet).  
 10. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-196 (repealed 1969). 
 11. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961) (dismissing the declaratory 
judgment claims for failure to allege a case or controversy); Tileston v. Ullman, 
318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (dismissing a physician’s appeal from a denial of 
declaratory judgment for lack of standing). 
 12. 318 U.S. 44 (1943). 
 13. See id. at 46 (dismissing the physician’s appeal because he asserted a 
denial of only his patients’ constitutional rights, not his own); see also GARROW, 
supra note 6, at 94–95, 102–05 (explaining how the appeal cited only a 
deprivation of “life” under the Fourteenth Amendment, which Tileston lacked 
standing to raise). 
 14. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961) (concluding that there was 
no Article III case or controversy after evaluating the “appropriateness of the 
issues for decision by this Court and the actual hardship to the litigants of 
denying them the relief sought”).  
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P.T. Barnum had brought to enactment in 1879.15 Ironically, 
Griswold created constitutional protection for reproductive 
choices only because Roman Catholic political actors had 
prevented any legislative resolution of a controversy that had 
appeared before Connecticut’s state legislature every two years, 
without exception, from 1923 through 1963.16 
Once Griswold bestowed constitutional protection upon a 
right to privacy regarding contraceptive use, the doctrinal door 
was thereby opened for young academics and litigators who 
would take that initially modest doctrinal innovation and expand 
it beyond application to simply contraceptive choice. The most 
important and most remarkable aspect of the story of the creation 
of the very idea of a right to abortion is how something that 
almost literally had never, prior to 1963, ever been publicly 
suggested by anyone anywhere in America,17 then, after 
Griswold, developed and spread so rapidly that by late 1969 and 
early 1970 multiple such federal constitutional claims were being 
filed independently of each other in district courts across the 
country.18 
Across the years 1967, 1968, and 1969, a nationwide set of 
young lawyers became convinced that Griswold’s constitutional 
privacy analysis, whether best captured by Justice William O. 
Douglas’s penumbras and emanations majority opinion,19 Justice 
                                                                                                     
 15. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 15–16 (providing a detailed history of the 
enactment and attempted repeal of Connecticut’s 1879 contraception 
prohibition). 
 16. See id. at 15–217 passim (describing the history of the Connecticut 
contraception prohibition). 
 17. See id. at 272–74 (reviewing the early history of public support for the 
legalization of abortion to conclude that, with few exceptions, “open discussion of 
whether abortion should to some greater degree be legalized simply did not take 
place”); see also id. at 293 (attributing the first public argument for an 
unconditioned right to obtain an abortion to University of California at Santa 
Barbara biologist Garrett Hardin in October 1963). 
 18. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 742–43 (N.D. Ohio 
1970) (noting that this constitutional challenge to an Ohio abortion law under 
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments was 
“another in a series of cases which have been and are being filed in various 
courts throughout the United States attacking the constitutionality of state 
statutes forbidding abortions”). 
 19. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“The foregoing 
cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
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Arthur Goldberg’s invocation of the long-ignored Ninth 
Amendment,20 or Justice John M. Harlan’s unapologetic embrace 
of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process liberty,21 
should protect a woman’s desire to abort a pregnancy as well as 
for marital contraception. As of 1966 and 1967, almost the entire 
population of activists and legislators who were working to 
liberalize the criminal statutes that disallowed almost any legal 
abortion in every single state had as their state-by-state goals the 
passage of reform legislation that would allow some individual 
women with specific medical reasons for wanting an abortion to 
apply and win approval from some hospital-based committee of 
doctors.22 
This push for what was called “abortion law reform” 
registered its first surprising successes in Colorado, North 
Carolina, and then California in the spring of 1967,23 but within 
hardly twelve months’ time the realization began to dawn on 
almost all of those reform proponents that the number of 
pregnant women wanting abortions who actually qualified for 
them under these new statutes was exceedingly modest, and that 
the vast majority of women hoping to end pregnancies did not 
have particular therapeutic or health reasons for doing so.24 
Thus, with a speed that in retrospect is incredibly striking, 
virtually the entire community of therapeutic reform advocates 
                                                                                                     
substance.”). 
 20. See id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“In sum, I believe that the 
right of privacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic—a personal 
right ‘retained by the people’ within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment.”). 
 21. See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In my view, the 
proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute 
infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
enactment violates basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”). 
 22. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 304–34 (describing public abortion 
activism from 1966 to 1967, which “remained fairly within a legislative context 
and reflected largely a reform orientation”). 
 23. See id. at 323–25, 327–32 (describing early abortion reform bills passed 
in Colorado, North Carolina, and California, which allowed abortion under a 
limited set of circumstances). 
 24. See, e.g., The Desperate Dilemma of Abortion, TIME, Oct. 13, 1967, at 33 
(“The key question is whether limited legislation is any solution. In fact, the new 
laws merely codify what hospitals are already doing.”); see also GARROW, supra 
note 6, at 341–42, 351, 360, 374–76 (providing examples of public discontent 
with the modest impact of legislative reform). 
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shifted to support of abortion law repeal, that is the legalization 
of abortion irrespective of the reasons why a pregnant woman 
wanted to obtain one.25 Rather than viewing abortion from a 
fundamentally medical perspective, where women had to invoke 
some health rationale and then win multiple doctors’ blessings in 
order to get an abortion, now the proponents of change were 
acknowledging that what was fundamentally at issue was 
women’s claim that the abortion decision should be their own, 
and not the product of a medical authorization process.26 
 This evolution brought the proponents of state-by-state 
legislative change to the same stance and worldview that a few 
young lawyers had begun striving to articulate in constitutional 
rights terms from 1967–68 onward. The most important, original, 
and influential of these lawyers was Roy Lucas, who graduated 
from NYU Law School in 1967 and spent the ensuing academic 
year teaching at the University of Alabama Law School before 
returning to New York in the summer of 1968,27 just as the North 
Carolina Law Review was publishing his seminal article detailing 
how state anti-abortion laws were highly susceptible to 
constitutional attack in federal court lawsuits based upon 
Griswold’s precedent.28 
Lucas and other strategists spent the latter half of 1968 and 
the first nine months of 1969 slowly preparing to file the very 
first such test case, and on the last day of September Hall v. 
Lefkowitz29—the named defendant being New York State’s 
                                                                                                     
 25. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 335–88 (providing a comprehensive 
history of the shift from activism aimed at legislative reform to abortion 
prohibition repeal). 
 26. See id. at 376 (documenting the emergence of public recognition of a 
woman’s right to abortion). 
 27. See id. at 335–39 (describing the origin of Roy Lucas’s interest in 
advocating for a right to obtain an abortion and the initial impact of his 
academic work); Ian Urbina, Roy Lucas, 61, Legal Theorist Who Helped Shape 
Roe Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2003, at C10 (recounting Lucas’s life and role in 
developing the right to obtain an abortion). 
 28. See Roy Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement 
and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REV. 730, 731 (1968) 
(“This article, however, examines the possibility of federal constitutional bases 
for invalidating state abortion restrictions.”).  
 29. 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The case was consolidated with 
three other cases and referred to a three-judge panel in Hall v. Lefkowitz. Id. at 
1031. 
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Attorney General—was filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.30 Dr. Robert E. Hall and the other 
three named plaintiffs were all extremely prominent obstetrician-
gynecologists with medical school professorships, and throughout 
the loosely coordinated network of attorneys interested in 
constitutional challenges to state abortion statutes, the belief was 
that there were no possible plaintiffs who could more impress 
federal judges than high-status doctors.31 Lucas intended for 
similar if not identical federal cases to be filed in other states, 
including Texas, where his intended lead plaintiff was prominent 
Fort Worth obstetrician-gynecologist, Dr. Hugh W. Savage,32 but 
come the spring of 1970 Lucas’s carefully laid plans were 
upended on multiple fronts by unexpected events. 
In early March, a young lawyer in Dallas, Linda Coffee, who 
had been in repeated contact with abortion repeal supporters 
both there and in Austin, but not with Lucas or any other out-of-
state attorneys, filed a pseudonymous abortion rights case in 
federal court there against the local district attorney33: Roe v. 
Wade.34 Far more importantly, certainly in the eyes of 
contemporary observers, on April 9 the New York State 
Assembly, with no votes to spare, passed a bill legalizing abortion 
until the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy.35 The far-off state of 
Hawaii had surprisingly passed a repeal bill, but including a 
residency requirement, weeks earlier,36 yet the New York law, 
scheduled to take effect on July 1, included no such restriction, 
                                                                                                     
 30. Id. at 1030–31 (listing defendants). 
 31. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 378–80 (describing the strategic choice of 
plaintiff, forum, and timing in Lucas’s New York challenge). 
 32. See id. at 381, 383–88 (describing potential lawsuits to challenge 
abortion laws in Texas, Colorado, North Carolina, Washington, and Iowa). 
 33. See id. at 389–407 (describing the factual circumstance that led to 
Linda Coffee’s involvement in and filing of Roe and Doe in federal court in 
Texas). 
 34. 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970). 
 35. Act of Apr. 11, 1970, ch. 127, 1970 N.Y. Laws 852 (codified as amended 
at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney 2013)); see also GARROW, supra note 6, 
at 421–22 (describing the dramatic passage of New York’s repeal bill in the state 
assembly). 
 36. Act of Mar. 11, 1970, ch. 1, sec. 2, 1970 Haw. Sess. Laws 1 (codified as 
amended at HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16 (West 2013)); see also GARROW, supra note 
6, at 412–14 (describing the impetus for and passage of Hawaii’s repeal bill). 
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thus soon making a legal abortion available to any woman with 
the wherewithal to travel to New York.37 But a major casualty of 
that landmark new statute was Lucas’s carefully designed initial 
test case, which was mooted by the legislature’s action,38 and two 
major byproducts ensued once the New York statute did take 
effect in mid-summer. One, among proponents, was a major, 
economy-minded push to launch specialized clinics where 
abortions could be performed at vastly lower cost than what 
hospitals would charge;39 the second, among opponents, was the 
belated realization that far more energetic political activity would 
be necessary on behalf of the right-to-life cause if the emerging 
trend toward abortion law repeal was to be staunched or pushed 
                                                                                                     
 37. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 421 (“Repeal proponents . . . quickly 
began to warn that New York, and especially New York City, might be all but 
inundated by a nationwide flood of women seeking to terminate unwanted 
pregnancies . . . .”). 
 38. Id. at 421. Although Lucas and others had no way of knowing so at the 
time, in historical retrospect the derailing of Hall as the first federal court case 
testing his constitutional argument was actually a positive development. See A. 
Raymond Randolph, Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly’s Draft Abortion 
Opinion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1035, 1038–42 (2006) (concluding from his 
draft opinion that Judge Friendly would not have found New York’s abortion 
laws unconstitutional). 
 39. This choice would have enormous and, at the time, largely 
unappreciated consequences for the provision of abortion services across all 
future decades: the concentration of abortion performance in “free-standing” 
clinics, unattached to any hospitals or comprehensive care networks, would in 
future years isolate many abortion providers from the wider medical profession 
and render them oftentimes lonely and sometimes besieged figures. See 
GARROW, supra note 6, at 456–57 (describing the risks of “free-standing” 
abortion clinics). In 1970, only Dr. Robert E. Hall had the foresight and 
perspicacity to warn how momentous these consequences would be. See id. at 
456–57, 483 (summarizing some of Hall’s public arguments for performing 
abortions in hospitals); David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: 
An Historical Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 839 (1999) [hereinafter Garrow, 
Abortion Before and After] (“Hall argued, pro-choice forces were in essence 
declaring that organized medicine, which had become an important participant 
in abortion liberalization efforts, no longer had to hold itself responsible for 
helping to provide actual abortion services.”); Symposium, Pregnancy 
Termination: The Impact of New Laws, 6 J. REPROD. MED. 274, 293–94 (1971) 
(recording Dr. Hall’s argument that abortions should be performed in hospitals 
to avoid substandard procedures); Robert E. Hall, Realities of Abortion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1971, at 27 (arguing the safety and health advantages of 
requiring abortions to be performed in hospitals); LORI FREEDMAN, WILLING AND 
UNABLE: DOCTORS’ CONSTRAINTS IN ABORTION CARE vii (2010) (noting how 
“abortion care is marginalized in American medicine”). 
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back.40 New York’s enactment of repeal was far and away the 
single most important pre-1973 abortion-related event because it 
was New York’s legalization that spurred the mobilization of 
anti-abortion activism well prior to January of 1973.41 Come 
November 1970, Washington State by popular vote became the 
fourth state to legalize abortion,42 but from that point in time 
onward, across all of calendar 1971 and all of calendar 1972, anti-
abortion forces, rather than pro-repeal forces, were consistently 
in the political driver’s seat as the blowback against New York’s 
legalization generated a nationwide anti-abortion political 
upsurge.43 Once anyone immerses themselves in the 
contemporary political record of that 1971–1972 time period, one 
inescapably sees the political landscape turning very much 
against abortion legalization, notwithstanding how Roy Lucas 
and several dozen other generally young attorneys, sometimes 
coordinated and sometimes not, were filing more than two dozen 
state-by-state constitutional challenges to existing anti-abortion 
statutes.44 
The first abortion case to come before the U.S. Supreme 
Court was United States v. Vuitch,45 in which the justices heard 
two full hours of argument in January 1971.46 Vuitch had seen a 
                                                                                                     
 40. See Garrow, Abortion Before and After, supra note 39, at 840–41 
(arguing that state legislative repeal efforts, not the breadth of Roe v. Wade, 
initially motivated mobilization of right to life activists). Effective July 29, 
Alaska became the third state to legalize abortion. GARROW, supra note 6, at 
431–32. 
 41. See Garrow, Abortion Before and After, supra note 39, at 840 (“[Before 
Roe and Doe] the most important development which took place subsequent to 
the New York victory was the mobilization of a significant right to life 
movement.”). 
 42. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.060–.090 (repealed 1991); see also 
GARROW, supra note 6, at 466 (describing Washington’s popular vote legalization 
of abortion as “perhaps [national activists’] most politically important victory so 
far”). 
 43. See Garrow, Abortion Before and After, supra note 39, at 841 (“Thus, by 
November 1972 . . . prospects for making any sort of non-judicial headway with 
abortion law liberalization looked very bleak indeed.”). 
 44. See id. (“During 1971 and 1972, pro-choice forces won no political 
victories, and New York activists were worried as to whether they could 
continue to protect their statute from legislative repeal after Nelson Rockefeller 
left the governorship.”). 
 45. 402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
 46. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 473–80 (providing a history of Vuitch). 
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prominent federal district judge dismiss a criminal prosecution of 
a doctor who performed abortions under the District of 
Columbia’s unusually liberal anti-abortion law, which authorized 
abortions necessary to preserve a woman’s health, on the grounds 
that that “health” standard was unconstitutionally vague.47 After 
extended internal discussion, the Supreme Court reversed the 
lower court’s vagueness ruling, but in so doing declared that the 
statute’s promulgation of a “health” exception was not 
unconstitutionally vague so long as “health” was correctly 
understood to cover a pregnant woman’s “psychological as well as 
physical well-being.”48 Repeal proponents quickly appreciated 
that that holding was actually a significant victory, rather than a 
defeat,49 and several weeks after handing down Vuitch the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear two of several other abortion cases 
in which it had been deferring any action until Vuitch was 
decided.50 
One case in which the High Court already had declined to 
intervene was Minnesota’s highly publicized criminal prosecution 
of a well-regarded St. Paul physician, Dr. Jane Hodgson, who in 
April 1970, with the support of other prominent local M.D.’s, had 
initiated a federal court suit seeking both declaratory and 
injunctive relief so that she could perform a hospital abortion on 
a young married patient, Nancy K. Widmyer, whose nine-week-
old fetus had indisputably been exposed to rubella virus.51 The 
federal district judge before whom the matter came refused to 
issue any immediate order, and nine days later Dr. Hodgson 
performed the abortion.52 Three weeks later Hodgson was 
                                                                                                     
 47. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D.D.C. 1969). 
 48. Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72–73. 
 49. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 490–91 (“Indeed, it quite rapidly became 
clear that the decision would significantly increase rather than decrease 
abortion availability in the nation’s capital.”). 
 50. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (striking parts of the Texas 
abortion statute as unconstitutional); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973) 
(finding aspects of Georgia’s abortion statute “violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 480, 491 (describing the 
Justices’ decisions to delay consideration of these cases until after Vuitch was 
decided). 
 51. Marcia D. Greenberger & Rachel K. Laser, Human Rights Hero: Jane 
Hodgson, M.D., 30 HUM. RTS. 2, Spring 2003, at 24, 24. 
 52. Id. 
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criminally indicted by the local district attorney, and both before, 
and again after those charges were filed, the federal court 
insisted that no “case or controversy” existed and refused to 
intervene.53 
Dr. Hodgson went to trial in November 1970, after both the 
Minnesota Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court declined 
to halt her prosecution.54 Hodgson had retained Roy Lucas to aid 
in her defense, but with both the attorney and the defendant 
hoping for a conviction rather than an acquittal, so that her case 
could proceed forward with the best possible set of facts for 
challenging anti-abortion laws, Dr. Hodgson’s non-jury trial 
featured Mrs. Widmyer and a Mayo Clinic physician as the 
primary defense witnesses.55 The trial judge indeed found 
Hodgson guilty, and while briefing in her appeal to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court would not be complete until the summer of 1971, 
at least the two Minnesota natives on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and junior Associate Justice 
Harry A. Blackmun, who once had worked at the Mayo Clinic and 
was well-acquainted with Hodgson’s top medical supporter, Dr. 
Joseph H. Pratt,56 both indicated during the Court’s consideration 
of Vuitch that they knew very well that Hodgson’s criminal 
appeal was headed their way.57 
The two cases that the High Court in early May 1971 did, 
soon after Vuitch, agree to hear, Roe v. Wade from Texas and Doe 
v. Bolton58 from Georgia, had both been filed in early 1970 and 
had then come before special three-judge district courts from 
                                                                                                     
 53. Doe v. Randall, 314 F. Supp. 32, 35–36 (D. Minn. 1970); see also 
GARROW, supra note 6, at 428–30 (providing a history of Hodgson’s involvement 
in the abortion reform movement and Randall). 
 54. GARROW, supra note 6, at 466–67. 
 55. See id. at 467–68 (describing that the case “‘could not be better,’ as it 
posed abortion’s constitutional issues in the most compelling context”). 
 56. See id. at 474 (“A few abortion litigators had heard talk that Blackmun 
was a good friend of Mayo’s Dr. Joseph H. Pratt, Jane Hodgson’s most 
prominent Minnesota medical supporter, and even that Pratt had been Mrs. 
Blackmun’s doctor . . . .”). 
 57. For Justice Blackmun’s references to Randall, see Oral Argument at 
54:44, United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (No. 84), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1970/1970_84#argument. For discussion of 
Chief Justice Burger’s anticipation of Randall, see GARROW, supra note 6, at 
479. 
 58. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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which direct appeal to the Supreme Court was possible following 
the panels’ denials of injunctive relief.59 Both panels had 
nonetheless ruled against the existing Texas and Georgia 
abortion statutes,60 and with a plethora of other abortion cases 
already docketed before the High Court—including ones from 
Louisiana, Missouri, and Illinois61—and others, like Jane 
Hodgson’s, known to be looming, it was unsurprising that five 
Justices—Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, White, and Marshall—
voted to accept both Roe and Doe for argument on the merits 
come October Term 1971.62 
It is often asserted, most notably by someone who is now 
herself a Supreme Court Justice, that the Justices should—and 
could—have avoided or at least postponed any consideration of 
Roe and Doe’s constitutional merits in 1971–72.63 That assertion 
is often interwoven with the claim that such a delay would have 
allowed proliberalization forces to continue making progress 
politically state-by-state,64 but, following Washington State’s 
adoption of its repeal law thanks to a popular referendum vote in 
November 1970,65 in no state whatsoever were any additional 
                                                                                                     
 59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120–22 (1973); Doe, 410 U.S. at 185–87. 
 60. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Doe v. Bolton 
319 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (N.D. Ga. 1970). 
 61. See Rosen v. La. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 412 U.S. 902, 902 (1973) 
(vacating judgment and remanding “for further consideration in light of” the Roe 
and Doe decisions); Rodgers v. Danforth, 410 U.S. 949, 949 (1973) (same); 
Hanrahan v. Doe, 410 U.S. 950, 950 (1973) (same). 
 62. GARROW, supra note 6, at 491. 
 63. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality 
in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 385–86 (1985) (“The political 
process was moving in the early 1970s, not swiftly enough for advocates of 
quick, complete change, but majoritarian institutions were listening and acting. 
Heavy-handed judicial intervention was difficult to justify and appears to have 
provoked, not resolved, conflict.”). 
 64. See id. at 380–82 (arguing that the breadth of Roe provoked legislative 
backlash reversing a trend toward liberalization); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1205 (1992) (“In 1973, 
when Roe issued, abortion law was in a state of change across the nation. As the 
Supreme Court itself noted, there was a marked trend in state legislatures 
‘toward liberalization of abortion statutes.’”). But see David Garrow, History 
Lesson for the Judge: What Clinton’s Supreme Court Nominee Doesn’t Know 
About Roe, WASH. POST, June 20, 1993, at C3 (arguing that Justice Ginsburg 
misconstrued the political landscape prior to Roe); Garrow, Abortion Before and 
After, supra note 39, at 837, 840–41 (same). 
 65. GARROW, supra note 6, at 465–66. 
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repeal measures enacted during 1971 or 197266 and only Florida 
managed to approve even a reform bill.67 What’s more, in New 
York State, come May 1972, the state legislature voted to repeal 
the 1970 legalization statute, and only Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller’s veto kept the 1970 law in place.68 Later that year, 
efforts to duplicate Washington State’s 1970 popular vote success 
went down to overwhelming defeats in both Michigan and North 
Dakota.69 
Four months after the Court announced that it would hear 
Roe and Doe, a six-day period in September 1971 witnessed the 
back-to-back resignations of aging Justices Hugo L. Black and 
John M. Harlan, suddenly reducing the Court to a seven- rather 
than nine-member bench.70 By early December neither of their 
successors, Lewis F. Powell and William H. Rehnquist, had yet 
been seated, and without dissent the remaining justices denied 
Texas’s request to postpone oral argument until a full Court was 
available and proceeded to hear argument in Roe and Doe on 
December 7.71 
The Justices’ private, post-argument conference discussion of 
the two cases revealed that a clear majority favored affirmance of 
the lower court’s ruling in Roe, but no consensus whatsoever 
about how to resolve Doe,72 and Chief Justice Burger assigned 
responsibility for preparing opinions in both cases to the Court’s 
junior Justice, Harry A. Blackmun.73 Notwithstanding that 
assignment, both Justices William O. Douglas and William J. 
Brennan privately prepared, and shared with each other, initial 
                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 483–85, 495–96, 506–07. 
 67. Id. at 538–39. 
 68. Id. at 545–47. 
 69. Id. at 562–63, 576–77 (noting that despite favorable polling, the 
Michigan referendum lost by a vote of 61 to 39 percent and the North Dakota 
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 70. Id. at 507. 
 71. Id. at 521–27. 
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SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT 86 (1988) 
(“Despite the fact that he was not part of the majority, the Chief Justice 
assigned the opinions in the two abortion cases to Justice Blackmun.”). 
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drafts of potential opinions in Doe, and both Justices’ writings, 
just like the seven Justices’ conference discussion, left no doubt 
whatsoever that a decision on the merits regarding the Griswold-
based challenge to the constitutionality of anti-abortion statutes 
was going to occur in at least one of the two cases.74 Once Justices 
Powell and Rehnquist were sworn in and seated in early 1972, 
Blackmun himself nominated both Roe and Doe as candidates for 
possible reargument before a full, nine-member Court, though 
any decision on that question would await Blackmun’s own 
drafting efforts.75 
Only in mid-May 1972 did Blackmun finally circulate an 
unusually brief, seventeen page draft of an opinion in Roe v. 
Wade,76 and, to the disappointment and consternation of at least 
four of his colleagues, it proposed that the Court hold Texas’s 
anti-abortion law unconstitutional solely on the grounds that its 
inclusion of only a maternal “life” exception was void for 
vagueness.77 Justices Brennan and Douglas both voiced direct 
complaints,78 and several days later Blackmun circulated a 
significantly more substantive draft opinion for Doe v. Bolton.79 
However, as the Justices proceeded to exchange views about that 
draft, Justice Byron R. White circulated a brief, three-page draft 
of a dissent from Blackmun’s proposed Roe opinion, cogently 
highlighting how any holding that Texas’s statute was 
unconstitutionally vague would necessarily override the Court’s 
                                                                                                     
 74. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 534–37 (recounting the dialogue between 
Justices Douglas and Brennan regarding draft Doe opinions); SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 73, at 93–102 (reprinting Justice Douglas’s first Doe draft). 
 75. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Chief Justice Burger (Jan. 18, 1972) 
(on file with the Library of Congress, Brennan Box 249); see also GARROW, supra 
note 6, at 537–38 (quoting Justice Blackmun’s letter). 
 76. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 103–19 (reprinting the first Roe draft). 
 77. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 547–48 (describing Blackmun’s Roe draft 
as being of “disappointing quality” that “immediately generated a good deal of 
additional woe in Douglas’s chambers as well as those of Justice Marshall, 
Brennan, and Stewart”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 89–90 (labeling Justice 
Blackmun’s vagueness analysis as “far from impressive”). 
 78. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 549–50 (quoting the Brennan and 
Douglas memos). 
 79. See id. at 550–51 (describing Justice Blackmun’s Doe draft as “a 
considerably more sophisticated and far-reaching piece of work than his Roe 
circulation”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 120–40 (reprinting Justice 
Blackmun’s first Doe draft). 
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thirteen-month-old holding in Vuitch, for “[i]f a standard which 
refers to the ‘health’ of the mother . . . is not impermissibly vague, 
a statutory standard which focuses only on ‘saving the life’ of the 
mother would appear to be a fortiori acceptable.”80 
White’s action pushed Blackmun to return to the stance he 
had suggested four months earlier, namely that both Roe and Doe 
should be held over for reargument before all nine justices early 
in the following term.81 Such a move, Blackmun said, would also 
allow him, over the summer, to devote more study and work to 
the two opinions,82 and despite vocal objections from Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, all of whom worried that 
Blackmun might with time abandon their tentative majority’s 
stance on the constitutional merits, both Justices Powell and 
Rehnquist weighed in favoring reargument,83 and in late June 
the Court so ordered, with only Douglas in public dissent.84 
By late in the summer of 1972, Blackmun’s two departing 
law clerks who had had responsibility for the Roe and Doe 
opinions, John T. Rich and George Frampton, were still strongly 
inclined to leave Roe as a void for vagueness holding and make 
Doe the more constitutionally significant decision.85 Frampton 
                                                                                                     
 80. Draft Circulation in Roe from Justice White to the Justices of the 
Supreme Court (May 26, 1972) (on file with the Library of Congress, Brennan 
Box 282); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 552 (quoting Justice White’s draft 
Doe dissent); SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 141–43 (reprinting the draft 
circulation). 
 81. See Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Blackmun to the 
Justices of the Supreme Court (May 31, 1972) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Brennan Box 282) (“Although it would prove costly to me personally, 
in the light of energy and hours expended, I have now concluded, somewhat 
reluctantly, that reargument in both cases at an early date in the next term, 
would perhaps be advisable.”); GARROW, supra note 6, at 552–53 (quoting Justice 
Blackmun’s memo). 
 82. See Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Blackmun to the 
Justices of the Supreme Court (May 31, 1972) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Brennan Box 282) (citing uncertainty about the detailed structure the 
abortion opinions should take as prompting Blackmun to “think about a 
summer’s delay”); GARROW, supra note 6, at 552–53 (quoting Justice Blackmun’s 
memo). 
 83. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 552–56 (documenting the intra-Court 
dynamics regarding the possibility of reargument). 
 84. See Roe v. Wade, 408 U.S. 919, 919 (1972) (granting reargument). 
 85. David J. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, LEGAL AFF., May–June 
2005, at 26, 29 [hereinafter Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun]. 
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told Blackmun the opinions should provide states with “a 
comprehensive prescription” for how to revise their abortion 
statutes, and he explained how in Doe  
I have written in, essentially, a limitation of the [abortion] 
right depending on the time during pregnancy when the 
abortion is proposed to be performed . . . . I have chosen the 
point of [fetal] viability for this ‘turning point’ (when state 
interests become compelling) for several reasons: a) it seems to 
be the line of most significance to the medical profession . . . ; 
b) it has considerable analytic basis in terms of the state 
interest as I have articulated it [regarding the fetus].86 
Frampton also explained that “I have included a section 
designed to show in greater detail that neither the law nor any 
other discipline has really arrived at a consensus about the 
beginning of life.”87 But Frampton apologized that with regard to 
constitutional privacy analysis, “I would have liked to do more 
here, but I really didn’t have time at the end” and that the 
deficiency was regrettable: “Since the opinion does use this right 
throughout, and since it is a new application of it, I think 
considerable explanation is required in addition to what the 
circulated draft contained—which was a little more than one 
sentence plus a string cite in [the] text” that dated from three 
months earlier.88 
In the weeks immediately preceding Roe and Doe’s scheduled 
rearguments on October 11, 1972, Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. 
gave Blackmun’s earlier drafts his first careful reading.89 Powell 
had no doubt that Texas’s anti-abortion law was “unduly 
restrictive of individual rights,” as he jotted in the margin of 
Blackmun’s Roe draft, but he also endorsed Byron White’s 
critique, noting “I agree that the Texas statute is not unconst. 
vague.”90 At bottom, Powell wrote to himself, “Why not 
                                                                                                     
 86. Id. (quoting Letter from George T. Frampton to Justice Blackmun (Aug. 
11, 1972) (on filed with the Library of Congress, Blackmun Papers, Box 152)). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. David J. Garrow, Revelations on the Road to Roe, AM. LAW., May 2000, 
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 90. Id. at 81–82. 
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consolidate Texas + Ga. cases + rely on Ga. type analysis” to void 
both states’ statutes on constitutional privacy grounds.91 
Several days later, Powell mentioned to his law clerk 
assigned to assist on Roe and Doe, Larry Hammond, that they 
should pay heed to a majority opinion that a three-judge court 
considering a challenge to Connecticut’s abortion statute had 
issued just two weeks earlier, on September 20, 1972.92 In that 
case, Abele v. Markle,93 District Judge Jon O. Newman, writing 
for himself and Second Circuit Judge J. Edward Lumbard, had 
observed that in the context of an unwanted pregnancy, “the right 
to an abortion is of even greater concern to the woman than the 
right to use a contraceptive protected in Griswold” and thus 
voided the Connecticut law.94 Newman went on to say that “a 
fetus is not a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment” and that “its capacity to become such a person does 
not mean that during gestation it is such a person.”95 
Hammond prepared a bench memo for Powell, reviewing 
Blackmun’s earlier drafts, revisiting Griswold, and summarizing 
Judge Newman’s analysis.96 Given Griswold, “it would not be 
difficult for this Ct. to find a fundamental right of a woman to 
control the decision whether to go through the experience of 
pregnancy and assume the responsibilities that occur 
thereafter.”97 Hammond recommended to Powell that “you might 
reason as Judge Newman does that the state interest becomes 
more dominant when the fetus is capable of independent 
existence (or becomes ‘viable’).”98 Highlighting how Texas, like 
Connecticut, was defending its statute by contending that fetuses 
were constitutional “persons,” Hammond noted that “the crux of 
Judge Newman’s analysis is that the state may not bar abortional 
freedom altogether on the basis of a proposition that is subject to 
such a great public debate and affects individuals so 
                                                                                                     
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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personally.”99 Overall, Hammond observed, “I do believe that a 
well-reasoned opinion can be written reaching this result without 
placing the Ct. in the position of deciding as a super-legislature 
whether it will permit abortions at any specific point in time.”100 
During the two rearguments, Justice Potter Stewart readily 
interjected Newman’s name when one of the counsel, after 
mentioning the Connecticut decision, paused while trying to 
name its author.101 When the justices met in conference two days 
later, Stewart again referred by name to Newman before 
Blackmun explained that he still would like to make Doe the lead 
opinion on the Fourteenth Amendment privacy right issue and 
strike Texas’s statute on vagueness grounds while nonetheless 
leaving Vuitch undisturbed.102 But Lewis Powell, after indicating 
a belief that health factors, rather than economic considerations, 
ought to undergird abortion decisions, recommended, just as he 
had concluded when he first read Blackmun’s drafts, that the 
Texas statute too should be struck down on the basic 
constitutional question and that Roe should be the lead 
opinion.103 Powell’s statement led Blackmun to say that he would 
be “willing to bypass vagueness” in Roe and decide both cases on 
the same basic constitutional grounds.104 As the conference 
ended, it was clear to all the Justices that there were certainly six 
votes, and probably seven, depending upon Warren Burger, in 
support of Blackmun and Powell’s stance, with only Byron White 
and William Rehnquist in disagreement.105 
Following that conference, five weeks passed before Harry 
Blackmun circulated heavily revised opinions in both Roe and 
Doe, and altered one very significant particular from where 
George Frampton’s handiwork had left things three months 
                                                                                                     
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Oral Reargument at 8:45, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18), 
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earlier.106 In these revised drafts, as Blackmun told his colleagues 
in a cover memo, “I have concluded that the end of the first 
trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other 
selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally 
arbitrary.”107 In his Roe draft, Blackmun stated that during the 
first trimester of pregnancy, a state “must do no more than to 
leave the abortion decision to the best medical judgment of the 
pregnant woman’s attending physician.”108 However, “[f]or the 
stage subsequent to the first trimester, the State may, if it 
chooses, determine a point beyond which it restricts legal 
abortions to stated reasonable therapeutic categories that are 
articulated with sufficient clarity so that a physician is able to 
predict what conditions fall within the stated classifications.”109 
In the immediate wake of those two circulations, several 
extremely important developments rapidly took place. First off, 
the responses from Blackmun’s colleagues were positive and 
praiseful. William O. Douglas, previously the Justice most 
worried about Blackmun’s approach to the cases, complimented 
him on “an excellent job,”110 and Potter Stewart, who too had 
been concerned, applauded “an admirably thorough job.”111 
Perhaps most notably of all, even though Byron White and 
William Rehnquist were in disagreement with Blackmun, their 
comments on the opinions were gently, tentatively, and 
respectfully—rather than forcefully or angrily—expressed. 
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Almost immediately after reading the drafts, Rehnquist wrote 
privately to Blackman to say that  
although I am still in significant disagreement with parts of 
them, I have to take my hat off to you for marshaling as well 
as I think could be done the arguments on your side. I think I 
will probably still file a dissent, although more limited than I 
had contemplated after the conference discussion.112  
White admitted that he had been “struggling with these cases” 
and would “probably end up concurring in part and dissenting in 
part,”113 which in turn led Rehnquist to add that “I am about 
where Byron said he was” and would also “probably concur in 
part and dissent in part.”114 In short, anyone anticipating, 
particularly in light of White’s and Rehnquist’s subsequent 
writings, both in Roe and Doe themselves and especially in 
subsequent abortion cases in later years, that there had been 
vigorous and vociferous objections within the Supreme Court 
during late 1972 to Blackmun’s extension of Griswold-style 
constitutional privacy analysis to the question of abortion would 
be entirely mistaken. 
Indeed, what substantive objections other Justices—and 
clerks—did voice to Blackmun’s new drafts focused on the fact 
that in their view Blackmun’s choice of the end of the first 
trimester of pregnancy did not go far enough towards protecting a 
woman’s opportunity to obtain an abortion.115 On November 27, 
Lewis Powell’s clerk Larry Hammond gave the Justice a six-page 
memo critiquing Blackmun’s drafts.116 Hammond was happy that 
Blackmun “ha[d] embraced the straightforward constitutional 
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view taken by Judge Newman in the Connecticut case,” but was 
displeased by Blackmun’s focus on the end of the first 
trimester.117 “It is unnecessary to the result that we draw the 
line. If a line ultimately must be drawn, it seems that ‘viability’ 
provides a better point. This is where Judge Newman would have 
drawn the line.”118 
Powell marked up Hammond’s memo, writing “Unnecessary 
to draw line—but may be desirable,” and noting a bold “yes” next 
to another Hammond sentence: “Most people would probably 
agree that the state has a much greater interest in protecting a 
viable entity than it does at some earlier time.”119 Powell then 
sent a private letter to Blackmun, saying that “I am enthusiastic 
about your abortion opinions. They reflect impressive scholarship 
and analysis,” but pointedly asking “whether you view your 
choice of ‘the first trimester’ as essential to your decision.”120 
Powell noted how Blackmun himself had termed that choice 
“arbitrary,” and then voiced his overarching thought: “I have 
wondered whether drawing the line at ‘viability’—if we conclude 
to designate a particular point of time—would not be more 
defensible in logic and biologically than perhaps any other single 
time.” Powell then proceeded to quote some of Newman’s 
Connecticut opinion language to Blackmun, observing that “I 
rather agree with the view that the interest of the state is clearly 
identifiable, in a manner which would be generally understood, 
when the fetus becomes viable. At any point in time prior thereto, 
it is more difficult to justify a cutoff date.”121 
In Blackmun’s chambers, his new clerk handling Roe and 
Doe, Randall Bezanson, offered Blackmun some detailed thoughts 
about Powell’s comments: 
Let’s assume that prior to the end of the first trimester no 
limitations could be placed on abortion, as your opinion now 
provides. And assume that after viability the state’s interest 
becomes sufficiently compelling to prevent abortions except in 
limited circumstances—preserving the life of the mother, or 
her health as narrowly defined in a statute. I am still of the 
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opinion that during the ‘interim’ period between the end of the 
first trimester and viability (about six months), the state 
might impose some greater restrictions relating to medical 
dangers posed by the operation, e.g., the operation would have 
to be performed in a hospital, as opposed to a clinic close to a 
hospital, and the like. One of the positive attributes of your 
approach, as I see it, is that it leaves the state free to place 
increasing restrictions on abortions over the period of 
gestation if those restrictions are narrowly tailored to state 
interests. Justice Powell’s suggestion seems to view the 
relevant state interests too narrowly, and disregards the 
state’s interest in assuring that the medical procedures 
employed will be safe. Your opinion, as I view it, rests on two 
state interest[s], which become compelling in varying degrees 
over time, and not simultaneously: the state’s interest in 
preserving the life of the fetus (here the most logical cutoff, as 
Justice Powell suggests, is viability), and the state’s interests 
in assuring that the abortion procedure is safe and adequately 
protects the health of the patient (it is this interest to which I 
think Justice Powell gives too little weight). The fetus is pretty 
large at 4 or 5 or 6 months, although it may not be ‘viable.’ I 
would imagine, and your opinion suggests to me, that the 
medical risks which attend abortion of a fetus increase as the 
size of the fetus increases. Thus the state’s interests may 
increase vis-à-vis this factor before ‘viability.’ 
While the first trimester is, as you admit, an arbitrary 
cutoff, I don’t think that it is all that arbitrary, and I would 
not want to prejudge a state’s interests during the ‘interim’ 
period between the end of the first trimester and viability at 
this time. I would stand by your original position, subject to 
minor change, and leave the question of what legitimate 
interests a state might have of requiring greater protection 
through higher medical standards to another case.122 
On December 4, 1972, Blackmun replied to Powell in a letter 
that directly echoed Bezanson’s views of the choices they faced: 
I have no particular commitment to the point marking the end 
of the first trimester as contrasted with some other point, such 
as quickening or viability. I selected the earliest of the three 
because medical statistics and the statistical writings seemed 
to focus on it and to draw their contrasts between the first 
three months and the remainder of the pregnancy. In addition, 
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I thought it might be easier for some of the justices than a 
designated later point. I could go along with viability if it could 
command a court. By that time the state’s interest has grown 
large indeed. I suspect that my preference, however, is to stay 
with the end of the first trimester for the following reasons: 
(1) It is more likely to command a court. (2) A state is still free 
to make its decisions on the liberal side and fix a later point in 
the abortion statutes it enacts. (3) I may be wrong, but I have 
the impression that many physicians are concerned about 
facilities and, for example, the need of hospitalization, after 
the first trimester. I would like to leave the states free to draw 
their own medical conclusions with respect to the period after 
three months and until viability. The states’ judgments of the 
health needs of the mother, I feel, ought, on balance, to be 
honored.123 
One week later, though, on December 11, Blackmun, without 
citing Powell by name, sent all of the justices a two page memo 
which in retrospect marks the fundamental turning point in 
making the holdings in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton what they 
in the end came to be: 
One of the members of the Conference has asked whether my 
choice of the end of the first trimester, as the point beyond 
which a state may appropriately regulate abortion practices, is 
critical. He asks whether the point of viability might not be a 
better choice. 
The inquiry is a valid one and deserves serious 
consideration. I selected the earlier point because I felt that it 
would be more easily accepted (by us as well as others) and 
because most medical statistics and statistical studies appear 
to me to be centered there. Viability, however, has its own 
strong points. It has logical and biological justifications. There 
is a practical aspect, too, for I am sure that there are many 
pregnant women, particularly younger girls, who may refuse 
to face the fact of pregnancy and who, for one reason or 
another, do not get around to medical consultation until the 
end of the first trimester is upon them, or, indeed, has passed. 
I suspect that few could argue, or would argue, that a 
state’s interest by the time of viability, when independent life 
is presumably possible, is not sufficiently developed to justify 
appropriate regulation. What we are talking about, therefore, 
is the interval from approximately 12 weeks to about 28 
weeks. 
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One argument for the earlier date is that the state may 
well be concerned about facilities and such things as the need 
of hospitalization from and after the first trimester. If the 
point of viability is selected, a decision of this kind is 
necessarily left to the attending physician. 
I would be willing to recast the opinions at the later date, 
but I do not wish to do so if it would alienate any Justice who 
has expressed to me, either by writing or orally, that he is in 
general agreement, on the merits, with the circulated 
memorandum. 
I might add that some of the district courts that have 
been confronted with the abortion issue have spoken in 
general, but not specific, terms of viability. See, for example, 
Judge Newman’s observation in the last Abele v. Markle 
decision. 
May I have your reactions to this suggestion?124 
The first Justice to respond, William O. Douglas, that very day, 
told Blackmun “I favor the first trimester, rather than 
viability,”125 but the following day Thurgood Marshall’s chambers 
sent to Blackmun a vitally significant letter written by clerk 
Mark Tushnet,126 with only a single unimportant alteration in its 
text made by Marshall himself: 
I am inclined to agree that drawing the line at viability 
accommodates the interests at stake better than drawing it at 
the end of the first trimester. Given the difficulties which 
many women may have in believing that they are pregnant 
and in deciding to seek an abortion, I fear that the earlier date 
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may not in practice serve the interests of those women, which 
your opinion does seek to serve. 
At the same time, however, I share your concern for 
recognizing the State’s interest in insuring that abortions be 
done under safe conditions. If the opinion stated explicitly 
that, between the end of the first trimester and viability, state 
regulations directed at health and safety alone were 
permissible, I believe that those concerns would be adequately 
met. 
It is implicit in your opinion that at some point the 
State’s interest in preserving the potential life of the unborn 
child overrides any individual interests of the women. I would 
be disturbed if that point were set before viability, and I am 
afraid that the opinion’s present focus on the end of the first 
trimester would lead states to prohibit abortions completely at 
any later date.  
In short, I believe that, as the opinion now stands, 
viability is a better accommodation of the interests involved, 
but that the end of the first trimester would be acceptable if 
additions along the lines I have suggested here were made.127 
The following day, William Brennan sent Blackmun a 
lengthier but very similar letter. Thanking Blackmun for “giving 
second thoughts to the choice of the end of the first trimester as 
the point beyond which a state may appropriately regulate 
abortion practices,” Brennan nonetheless went on to say that “if 
the ‘cut-off’ point is to be moved forward somewhat, I am not sure 
that the point of ‘viability’ is the appropriate point,” since “if we 
identify the state’s initial interests as the health of the woman 
and the maintenance of medical standards,” viability “as the 
point where a state may begin to regulate in consequence of these 
interests seems to be technically inconsistent” since viability 
concerned the fetus, not the woman.128 Fetal viability occurred 
only “at a point in time after the state has asserted its interest in 
                                                                                                     
 127. Letter Regarding Abortion Cases from Justice Marshall to Justice 
Blackmun (Dec. 12, 1972) (on file with the Library of Congress, Marshall Box 
99); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 583–84 (quoting Justice Marshall’s letter). 
 128. GARROW, supra note 6, at 584 (quoting Letter from Justice Brennan to 
Justice Blackmun (Dec. 13, 1972) (on file with the Library of Congress, Brennan 
Box 282)). 
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safeguarding the health of the woman and in maintaining 
medical standards.”129 Brennan went on to say that  
I have no objection to moving the ‘cut-off’ point . . . from the 
end of the first trimester . . . to a point more closely 
approximating the point of viability (20 to 28 weeks), but I 
think our designation of such a ‘cut-off’ point should be 
articulated in such a way as to coincide with the reasons 
for . . . creating such a ‘cut-off’ point.130 
Warren Burger and Potter Stewart weighed in less pointedly 
as well,131 while in Lewis Powell’s chambers Larry Hammond was 
elated at Blackmun’s memo, telling Powell that Blackmun’s 
acknowledgment that many young women might not appreciate 
their predicament early in pregnancy was crucial.132 Powell 
bracketed Hammond’s comments and wrote a bold “yes” by them 
in the margin, and then drafted a letter of his own to Blackmun, 
writing that “once we take the major step of affirming a woman’s 
constitutional right, it seems to me that viability is a more logical 
and defensible time for identifying the point at which the state’s 
overriding right to protect potential life becomes evident.”133 
Reprising Hammond’s points about young women in denial, 
Powell added that “if there is a constitutional right to an 
abortion, there is much to be said for making it effective where 
and when it may well be needed most,” and he closed by again 
mentioning how “favorably impressed” he was with Jon 
Newman’s opinion that “identified viability as the critical time 
from the viewpoint of the state.”134 
Powell left his letter unsent, either because he expressed his 
views to Blackmun in person, and/or because Marshall’s and 
                                                                                                     
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131.  Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Blackmun (Dec. 13, 1972) 
(on file with the Library of Congress, Brennan Box 282); Letter from Justice 
Stewart to Justice Blackmun (Dec. 14, 1972) (on file with Library of Congress, 
Brennan Box 282); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 585 (quoting Justice 
Burger’s and Justice Stewart’s responses). 
 132. See Garrow, Revelations, supra note 89, at 83 (quoting a memo from 
clerk Larry Hammond to Justice Powell expressing Hammond’s elation at 
Justice Blackmun’s recognition of the reality of young women’s difficulty in 
obtaining an abortion in the first trimester). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
918 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2014) 
Brennan’s successive letters had made much the same points,135 
and in Blackmun’s chambers Randall Bezanson concluded that 
revised opinions should  
articulate the two state interests, and the point at which they 
assume increasing significance. With respect to the state’s 
interest in preserving the safety of the operation and the 
conditions surrounding it, regulation might be permissible 
somewhere between the end of the 1st trimester (if that is the 
cut-off selected) and ‘viability’ or beyond. But with respect to 
the state’s interest in preserving fetal life, the opinion might, 
for example, indicate that only after “viability” does this 
interest become sufficiently compelling to support regulation 
in furtherance of this interest.136 
On December 15, Blackmun himself wrote to all his 
colleagues, thanking them for “the helpful suggestions” that had 
been made over the previous four days and saying he would 
revise his opinions in light of them.137 “I have in mind associating 
the end of the first trimester with an emphasis on health, and 
associating viability with an emphasis on the State’s interest in 
potential life. The period between the two points would be treated 
with flexibility.”138 
Six days later, Blackmun circulated his all-but-final drafts of 
both Roe and Doe, highlighting in a cover memo how in Roe “I 
have tried to recognize the dual state interests of protecting the 
mother’s health and of protecting potential life” and believed this 
was “a better approach” than his previous drafts.139 Roe’s all-too-
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 136. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, supra note 85, at 30 (quoting 
Memorandum from Randall P. Bezanson Regarding Mr. Justice Brennan’s 
Letter on the Abortion Cases (Dec. 14, 1972) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Blackmun Papers, Box 151)). 
 137. Memorandum to the Conference Regarding Abortion Cases from Justice 
Blackmun to the Justices of the Supreme Court (Dec. 15, 1972) (on file with the 
Library of Congress, Blackmun Box 151); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 585 
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 138. Memorandum to the Conference Regarding Abortion Cases from Justice 
Blackmun to the Justices of the Supreme Court (Dec. 15, 1972) (on file with the 
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 139. Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Blackmun to the Justices 
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Blackmun Box 151); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 585–86 (quoting Justice 
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brief constitutional discussion had not been significantly beefed 
up over the previous four months,140 but the opinion clearly 
delineated the two distinct compelling state interests that the 
Justices’ private exchanges had identified, holding that with 
regard to maternal health, “the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of 
present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the 
first trimester.”141 Secondly, “[w]ith respect to the State’s 
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 
‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then 
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the 
mother’s womb.”142 Blackmun observed that “[i]f the State is 
interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far 
as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is 
necessary to protect the life or health of the mother,” and in 
closing he emphasized that Roe’s holding “is consistent with the 
relative weights of the respective interests involved” and “leaves 
the State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the 
period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions are 
tailored to the recognized state interests.”143 
Blackmun’s supportive colleagues quickly signed on, with 
Potter Stewart remarking that he was “greatly impressed” with 
the new drafts’ “thoroughness and care”144 and Lewis Powell 
commending Blackmun for his “exceptional scholarship.”145 Thus 
when Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton emerged to public view a few 
                                                                                                     
 140. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 153 (1973)  
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state 
action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the 
Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
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with the Library of Congress, Blackmun Box 151); see also GARROW, supra note 
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weeks later on January 22, 1973, the two opinions articulated 
radically different holdings than would have been the case eight 
months earlier had Blackmun’s May 1972 drafts been handed 
down instead. Griswold’s doctrinal “privacy” legacy, and the 
young attorneys who had championed it, were by early 1972 
historical “givens,” as was Dr. Jane Hodgson’s impending appeal 
of her Minnesota criminal conviction, which was a direct echo of 
how Griswold itself had finally forced the Court to address the 
constitutionality of a state’s criminalization of the use of 
contraceptives.146 But from there forward, the ironies of what had 
transpired within the Supreme Court of the United States over 
the course of those eight months abound, often starkly. 
Had not Byron White, who in the end dissented far more 
vociferously than he had ever indicated in conference or in his 
comments to Blackmun,147 successfully derailed Blackmun’s 
initial void for vagueness approach in Roe by pointing out the 
fundamental contradiction between that view of “life” and what 
the Court in Vuitch had held regarding “health,” Roe v. Wade at 
age forty would be only somewhat more widely remembered than 
Vuitch. 
Three months later, in August 1972, just as he was leaving 
his clerkship with Harry Blackmun, George Frampton full well 
realized, and expressly pointed out, that due to his lack of time 
the two draft opinions were badly deficient in their explication of 
their constitutional “right to privacy” analysis and that 
“considerable explanation is required” beyond what little the 
drafts then contained,148 but notwithstanding all of the very 
                                                                                                     
 146. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480–81 (1965) (challenging 
Connecticut’s statute that made using contraceptives, or assisting another in 
using them, illegal). 
 147. Complaining about how, prior to viability, the majority’s holding meant 
that “the Constitution of the United States values the convenience, whim, or 
caprice of the pregnant woman more than the life or potential life of the fetus,” 
White declared that “I find nothing in the language or history of the 
Constitution to support the Court’s judgments. The Court simply fashions and 
announces a new constitutional right for pregnant women . . . with scarcely any 
reason or authority for its action . . . .” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221–22 (1973) 
(White, J., dissenting). Calling the rulings “an improvident and extravagant 
exercise of the power of judicial review,” White decried how the Court was 
barring “state efforts to protect human life” and giving “women and doctors . . . 
the constitutionally protected right to exterminate it.” Id.  
 148. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, supra note 85, at 29. 
HOW ROE V. WADE WAS WRITTEN 921 
detailed exchanges amongst justices and clerks over the ensuing 
four months about what the actual holdings should be, that 
deficient constitutional explanation was never again addressed, 
debated, or remedied.149 
In sharp contrast, beginning with Lewis Powell, and then 
including both his clerk, Larry Hammond, as well as Potter 
Stewart, two of the most interested and influential Justices 
focused upon District Judge Jon Newman’s brand new opinion in 
Abele v. Markle and its discussion of fetal viability as best 
illuminating the unclear path that lay before them. It was far 
from unusual for the Justices to rely so heavily upon the 
analytical approach of lower federal jurists; less than two years 
earlier, in Griggs v. Duke Power Company,150 a landmark ruling 
that represented the Court’s first substantive interpretation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,151 Chief Justice Burger’s 
ruling for a unanimous Court drew extensively and directly from 
recent opinions authored by prominent Circuit Judges John D. 
Butzner, John Minor Wisdom, and Simon E. Sobeloff.152 
The impact of Newman’s opinion, particularly upon Powell, 
went a long way towards explaining why fetal viability, rather 
than the end of the first trimester, became the fundamental 
constitutional “cut-off point” for abortion in the eyes of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.153 Powell’s repeated recommendation of that shift 
finally prevailed upon a clearly hesitant Harry Blackmun after 
first Mark Tushnet, on behalf of Thurgood Marshall, and then 
William Brennan, just like Randall Bezanson and George 
                                                                                                     
 149. See, most famously, John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A 
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973). “[Roe] is bad because it 
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 150. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 151. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 251 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000h-6 (2012)). See also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26 
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 152. See David J. Garrow, Toward a Definitive History of Griggs v. Duke 
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 153. See Garrow, Revelations, supra note 89, at 83 (providing examples of 
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Frampton before him within Blackmun’s own chambers, strongly 
endorsed Powell’s view that Roe and Doe’s protection of a 
woman’s largely unfettered right to choose abortion should be 
extended from approximately twelve weeks of pregnancy to 
twenty-four. 
It is of course ironic that Harry Blackmun, who has gone 
down in history first and overwhelmingly foremost as the author 
of Roe v. Wade, privately opposed making the case’s holding 
anywhere near as extensive as his final opinion actually came to 
be. Less striking perhaps, but still notable, is the initially similar 
opposition by the Court’s most notorious liberal, William O. 
Douglas, and a strong and perhaps poignant counterfactual 
argument can be made that an actual majority of the Roe Court, 
if one further tallies the always-reluctant Warren Burger along 
with the two actual dissenters, Byron White and William 
Rehnquist, would have preferred a holding that reached only to 
the end of the first trimester. But, instead, the more strongly 
articulated preferences of Lewis Powell, William Brennan, 
Thurgood Marshall’s chambers, and Potter Stewart decisively 
prevailed as Blackmun, encouraged also by Randall Bezanson, 
finally moved to accept Jon Newman’s emphasis upon the 
decisiveness of fetal viability. That a supposedly conservative, 
southern appointee of Republican President Richard M. Nixon, in 
tandem with a Roman Catholic justice named to the Court by 
Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and indirectly aided 
months earlier by the dissenting Byron White, made Roe v. Wade 
and Doe v. Bolton dramatically more far-reaching than they 
would have been had Harry Blackmun adhered to the view of 
pregnancy he brought to those repeated 1972 exchanges further 
underscores how ironic indeed it is that Roe and Doe came to be 
what they were on January 22, 1973. 
* * * 
In the spirit of this Symposium, three final points are in 
order. First, nine years ago, Jack Balkin stated the fundamental 
bottom-line of the constitutional principle concerning abortion as 
accurately and succinctly as any federal jurist ever has: 
“Individuals have the fundamental right to decide whether they 
want to become parents” and “the state may not force people to 
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become parents against their will.”154 Additionally, as Balkin 
correctly framed it, “[w]here a woman’s life or health is not in 
danger, the right to abortion is the right to a fair and realistic 
opportunity to choose whether or not to become a mother.”155 
Second, it is imperative, especially for those of us who 
believe, as the controlling “trio” opinion in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey156 rightly emphasized more 
than twenty years ago,157 that Roe v. Wade stands in complete 
partnership with Brown v. Board of Education158 as one of the 
two greatest twentieth-century constitutional beacons of human 
liberty and equality,159 and who also unapologetically embrace 
that oftentimes in many women’s lives, to utilize the title of a 
wonderful but little-remembered 1975 book, Abortion Is A 
Blessing,160 to forthrightly acknowledge that there is a 
fundamental difference between an eight- or ten-week abortion 
and an eighteen- or twenty-week abortion. Late second trimester 
abortion procedures161 are ethically as well aesthetically more 
difficult than first trimester pregnancy terminations, just as 
                                                                                                     
 154. WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 126, at 40; see also 
Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 294 
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From the Front Lines of the Abortion Wars, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 28, 
2008, at 17, 17 (reviewing pro-choice abortion clinician Susan Wicklund’s book, 
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Harry Blackman clearly acknowledged before the combined 
efforts of Lewis Powell, William Brennan, and a handful of young 
law clerks changed Roe and Doe into the opinions that we have 
known since 1973. Fetal viability, as Casey, Stenberg,162 and even 
Gonzales163 all acknowledge, should indeed remain the 
fundamental constitutional threshold, but we who defend Roe and 
champion Casey164 must not be shy in accepting open-minded 
discussion of what sorts of therapeutic standards, depending 
upon women’s individual circumstances, might properly govern 
access to legal abortion once a pregnancy reaches sixteen weeks 
or later. 
But that discussion cannot take place absent two things: first 
a universal acknowledgement that in every individual case, an 
earlier abortion is ethically preferable to a later abortion, and 
that statutes that have the effect of forcing women later into their 
pregnancies before they are able to access a legal abortion are 
thus a fortiori ethically repugnant; and second a universal 
acknowledgement that anyone and everyone who professes to 
want to reduce the incidence of abortion must publicly champion 
the widest and freest possible availability of all forms of 
contraception. Too oftentimes in debates over abortion, some 
participants who focus upon the undeniable humanity of the fetus 
refuse to acknowledge that their opposition to abortion is 
inseparable from an absolute opposition to all forms of “artificial” 
contraception. If any implicit or explicit “grand bargain” is to 
resolve, on the ground, the United States’ ongoing conflict over 
how easily and in what circumstances should legal abortion be 
readily available, an ungrudging embrace of maximum possible 
contraceptive access is the absolute essential and foundational 
building block. 
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